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We use the returns on a set of international financial securities to identify exogenous shocks to
the Canadian federal surplus. We find that a large portion of the variation in the surplus can be
replicated by a linear combination of these returns and that the rising debt observed in the 1980s
and 1990s was a result of adverse exogenous shocks and a delayed response by the government
to these shocks. We develop a formal framework to evaluate the potential gains from a fiscal risk
managementstrategy, usingthesesecuritiestohedgeagainstexogenousshocks. Weshowthatfiscal
risk management can generate significant welfare gains by enhancing the sustainability of fiscal
policy and thereby lowering average tax rates.
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The large public debts accumulated by many OECD economies during the last two decades have
created serious concern about the sustainability of fiscal policies and have become a major topic
of policy debate. Much of the economic literature on this subject rationalizes these large public
debts as the consequence of public sector bias towards deficits.1 However, the analysis fails to
explain why the public debt problem emerged in the mid–seventies and not before (see Alesina
and Perotti, 1995). To address this question, some authors have started to consider the role of
exogenous ‘‘fiscal shocks’’ — unexpected changes in government spending and revenues — as a
source of the rising public debt. However, their attention has largely been focused on how political
and fiscal institutions affect the government’s response to fiscal shocks,2 rather than on the shocks
themselves. Few studies have tried to investigate the actual contribution of fiscal shocks to the
rising public debt. The question of what governments can and should do to mitigate these shocks is
also left unanswered.
The focus of this paper is on fiscal shocks and it contributes to the literature in three key ways.
First, we estimate the contribution of exogenous factors to variations in the primary surplus and
measure their empirical importance to the rising public debt. Second, we characterize the response
of fiscal policy to these shocks. Finally, we show how a policy of fiscal risk management can
mitigate the adverse consequences of these external influences, and estimate the potential gains
from fiscal riskmanagementin terms of improved sustainability, lower average taxes and increased
welfare. As an empirical example we focus on the primary surplus and debt levels of the Canadian
federal government over the last forty years. Canada provides a good example for our analysis
because, during this period, the behavior of the public debt in Canada was very similar to that of
the OECD average. Moreover, since Canada is a small open economy, it is much easier to identify
fiscal shocks that are clearly exogenous to the Canadian government.
A key novelty of our analysis is that we identify exogenous fiscal shocks using the returns on
several international financial securities. Theideabehindthisapproachisthatifthefinancial market
isrelatively complete,thentherelevantriskcanberepresentedby somecombinationof thesemarket
returns.3 In addition to being exogenous with respect to Canada’s fiscal policy, we find that these
variables capture a larger portion of the variation in the primary surplus than the growth rate of
GDP or the unemployment rate — variables that have been used in previous studies (e.g. Roubini
and Sachs, 1989). Indeed, our empirical analysis reveals that the majority of the variation in the
primary surplusoverthisperiodcan bereplicatedby alinearcombinationof returnsoninternational
financial securities. In particular, the large deficits that were experienced in the seventies and early
1 See Persson and Svensson (1989), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Tabellini
(1991), Von Hangen (1992) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). Alesina and Perotti (1995) provides an excellent survey of this literature.
2 See Von Hagen (1991), Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Bohn and Inman (1995) and Alesina and
Perroti (1996).
3 This is referred to in the finance literature as the ‘‘spanning property’’.
1eighties can largely be attributed to these exogenous fiscal shocks. We also find that the surplus
process is best characterized by a time–invariant function of current and past shocks with an abrupt
policy regime shift towards higher primary surplus in the mid–1980s.
Our empirical results suggest that the problem of rising public debt in Canada was caused by a
series of adverse exogenous shocks that occurred in the late seventies and early eighties, and that
the problem was aggravated by the delay in the government’s response to the rising debt. Rather
than adjusting the primary surplus continually in response to the rising debt level, the Canadian
fiscal authoritiesmaintainedtheoriginal fiscal policy rulelongaftertheadverseshocksoccurred. A
significantshiftinthestanceoffiscal policy tookplaceonly whenthenetdebtreachedanalarmingly
high level and a new government came into power.4 Our evidence appears to be more consistent
with the predictions of a political economy model (e.g. Alesina and Drazen, 1991) that emphasizes
the role of adjustment costs in causing delays, rather than with the basic tax–smoothing model.
The use of financial market returns to represent exogenous shocks to the primary surplus allows
us to address two key questions: (1) To what extent can exogenous shocks to the primary surplus
be diversified in the international financial market, and (2) What are the potential gains of adopt-
ing such a fiscal risk management strategy? According to the optimal dynamic taxation theories of
Barro(1979) andLucasandStokey (1983),tax ratesshouldbemaintainedatrelatively constantlev-
els and should notbe usedto offsetall of the exogenous shocks to the primary surplus. For political
and institutional reasons, fiscal authorities may not be able to adjust fiscal policy instantaneously.
In the absence of state contingent borrowing and lending, however, a stable fiscal policy may be-
come unsustainable as the effects of the exogenous shocks accumulate and result in a rising debt,5
which could force the government to drastically raise taxes and cut spending in order to reduce the
debt. The more volatile is the primary surplus, the more likely it is that the tax rate will have to
be increased in the future. By hedging away the volatile component of the primary surplus that is
associated with the exogenous shocks, fiscal risk management might help to reduce the probability
of an excessively large and rising public debt.
To address these issues, we develop a conceptual framework that is consistent with our empir-
ical observations and consider a simple hedging strategy that effectively replaces the diversifiable
component of the primary surplus with a constant cash–flow that has the same present value. We
estimate the gains from fiscal risk management in terms of the sustainability of fiscal policy, aver-
age tax rates and welfare. We find that by increasing the sustainability of fiscal policy, fiscal risk
management results in sizable welfare gains by lowering expected tax rates in the short and long
run. However, in order to capture these gains, it is important that the hedging strategy be adopted
only when the net debt is at a sufficiently low level. When the level of the net debt is high, hedg-
4 1985, the year in which the fiscal policy change took place, is also the year when the Conservative Party became the majority party in Canadian
parliament.
5 Bohn (1991) provides several theoretical examples that illustrate the need for the government to issue state contingent bonds in stochastic
economies.
2ing may have the effect of reducing the probability that the net debt declines, thereby making any
given policy less sustainable. We characterize theconditions under which hedgingis desirable. Our
analysis implies that fiscal riskmanagementshould bestbe viewedas a way of avoiding future debt
problems rather than solving current ones.
We are not the first to emphasize the importance and potential benefits of using financial market
instruments in governmentfinance. In their seminal work, Lucas and Stokey (1983) showthat state
contingent bonds are crucial in implementing the optimal fiscal policy and maintaining the time–
consistency of thepolicy in thefaceof stochasticshocks.6 Bohn (1990)providesempirical evidence
that financial market instruments may help the US government to further smooth its tax rates and,
therefore, improve welfare. In contrast, we emphasize the role of fiscal shocks in affecting the
variation in budget surplus rather than in the tax rates. Our analysis shows that the impacts of these
shocks have largely been absorbedby thegovernment through risk–free borrowingand lending and
have, therefore, resulted in rising debt. While Bohn argues that risk management may help the
government toreducethe short–run variations in the tax rates, we showthat fiscal riskmanagement
can also help to reduce the probability of having a high debt, enhancing the long–run stability of
fiscal policy and thereby raise welfare.
The analysis contained in the rest of the paper is divided into two sections. In Section 2 we
estimate the impact of exogenous factors on the surplus process and determine the response of
the fiscal policy stance of the government to those factors. In Section 3 we develop a method for
evaluatingthepotential gainsof fiscal riskmanagement, andapply ittotheCanadian exampleusing
the empirical specification developed in Section 2. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Fiscal Shocks and Policy Response
After being consistently in surplus until the early 1970s, the Canadian budget balance exhibited
almost continuous deficits during the seventies and early eighties, followed by persistent surpluses
from the mid–1980s. The purpose of this section is to determine how much of the variation in the
surpluscanbeattributedtoexternal influencesandwhatpartstosignificantshiftsin‘‘fiscal stance’’.
2.1 The Exogenous Fiscal Shocks
We use the market returns on a set of international financial assets to measure fiscal shocks. These
marketreturns havebeenusedextensively in thefinanceliteraturetorepresentunderlyingfactorsin
stock market returns and to capture cyclical activity in the US (and, hence, the Canadian) economy.
Since Canada is a small open economy, it is safe to assume that these international variables are not
6 Zhu(1995) shows that, in an economy withcapital, governmentbonds thatare linked to capitalreturns can be used to ensure the time–consistency
of optimal fiscal policy even if there are no stochastic shocks.
3influenced by the government’s fiscal policy. Moreover, if the financial markets are relatively com-
plete, then itshouldbe possibletoreplicatealargeportion of thefiscal riskusingsomecombination
of these returns.
Theassetreturn variablesarethevalue weightedreturn on the NewY orkStock Exchanges VWR
(from the CRSP tape), the dividend yield DIV on the CRSP value–weighted index (measured as a
1–year backwardmovingaverageof dividendsdividedby themostrecentstockprice), the3–month
Treasury bill rate TBILL, the 1 year moving average of the 3–month Treasury bill rate TBMA; and
the rate of return on 10 year government bonds, LONGR. These variables, or linear combinations
of them, have been found to forecast asset returns and are discussed in more detail in Campbell
(1996). Wemultiply each of these by the nominal exchange rate to obtain the Canadian dollar value
of the return on each US dollar invested. This ensures that the US dollar values of the returns are
independent of the exchange rate and, therefore, Canadian government’s policy. Let Xt denote the
vector that contains these return variables.
2.2 The Fiscal Policy Rule
We adopt the following specification of the primary surplus process:
st = ft + a
0Xt + ½st¡1 + "t: (1)
Here st is the ratio of the nominal primary surplus to the trend of nominal GNP . The vector a
measures the marginal impact of the exogenous shocks to the primary surplus. It represents both
the effects of the shocks under a given policy and the effects through policy response to shocks.7
The term ft summarizes the permanent components of the government’s policy variables. It could
be time–varying and may change in response to the debt level and political events. The lagged
surplus term is intended to capture the persistency of the surplus process.8 Finally, the error term
"t is assumed to be a normal random variable that is uncorrelated with Xt, ft and st¡1. In section
3, we present a small open economy model in which the equilibrium primary surplus process takes
exactly the form that is specified in (1) with ½ = 0, and ft is a function of the effective tax rate on
output.
In order to estimate (1), we need to specify how the policy variable ft evolves over time. Two
alternative specifications are considered in our empirical analysis: 1) ft is a linear function of debt–
GNP ratio, and 2) ft is a step function of time. The first case corresponds to Barro’s tax smoothing
policy according to which the permanent components of the tax policy should be adjusted contin-
ually in response to the debt level. The policy rule implied by the second case is consistent with
the recent political economy literature that emphasizes delayed fiscal adjustments due to political
7 For example, government expenditures on an existing program may be a function of the shocks, a0
0Xt, and the government responses to the
shocks by setting the taxes equal to a0
1Xt. Then, a = a0 + a1. In principle, these parameters may not be constant over time.
8 This could be due to the costs associated with adjusting the surplus to the government’s long–run target levels.
4or institutional constraints.
2.3 The Contribution of Fiscal Shocks to the Primary Surplus
To determine the quantitative importance of exogenous shocks to the variation of the primary sur-
plus, wefirstrun asimplelinear regression of thesurplus–GNPtrendratio, st on theshockvariables
Xt. The resultis reported in the first column of Table 1 . Although the Durbin–Watson statistic sug-
gests thereisserial correlation intheresiduals, thisregression illustratesthestrikingfactthatalmost
70% of the variation in the surplus can be replicated by a simple linear combination of the asset re-
turns. When we include a lagged dependent variable, as in the second column, the specification
of the model improves, but it does not add much in terms of its explanatory power. Moreover, the
parameters of the model are quite robust to its inclusion.9
Figure 1 shows that there appears to have been a shift in the mean of the residuals during the
mid–1980s. After this point, although the model continues to replicate the direction of movements
in the surplus, it understates its true level. This is consistent with a level shift in the permanent
components of the government’s fiscal policy. The CUSUM test (which is a t–statistic testing for
structural stability) reported in the table shows that the null of no structural change is rejected at the
5% level.








Figure 1: Residuals from Surplus Regression
9 As a comparison, we also report the same regressions by using the change in real GNP growth and the unemployment rate, instead of Xt; as
shock variables. The results show that a much smaller portion of the variation in the surplus can be explained by these traditional shock variables
(see Appendix).
52.4 The Shift in Fiscal Stance
Thereareseveral reasonstosuspectthattheremay havebeenasignificantchangeinthefiscal stance
of the Canadian government during the 1980s. These include the rapidly rising debt, the associated
pressure from financial markets and a shift to a more conservative role for government. In the third
column of Table 1, we include the debt–GNP ratio (DEBT) as an additional regressor to see if the
structural change(s) can be explained by a continuous response of the fiscal policy to the rising
debt, as suggested by the Barro’s tax smoothing theory. Although DEBT is indeed a statistically
significant regressor, there is still evidence of structural change as indicated by the CUSUM test.
AnalternativetoBarro’staxsmoothingtheory isthewarof attritionmodel of AlesinaandDrazen
(1991), which emphasizes the political costs of adjusting fiscal policy. According to this theory,
fiscal responseto the rising debtmay be delayed duetoconflicts among differentgroups abouthow
the burden of the required policy change is to be shared. Because of the delay, the change in the
government’s fiscal policy is better described by a discrete regime change. Here we identify the




1Xt + ½1st¡1 + "1t; if t · t¤;
c1 + a0
2Xt + ½2st¡1 + "2t; if t > t¤: (2)
where"1t » N(0;¾2
1), "2t » N(0;¾2
2) andt¤ isunknown. Weusethemaximum likelihoodmethod
to estimate both the parameters and the break point t¤. The estimated t¤ is the second quarter of
1985. Figure 2 illustrates the maximized log–likelihood function (conditional on t¤) for different
switching dates. This figure illustrates quite clearly why maximum likelihood estimation pinpoints
the structural break as having occurred between the first and second quarter of 1985. We test the
significance of a structural break at this date with Chow tests for each of the regressions models
discussed above. As can be seen this hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
To examine further the nature of this regime switch we re–run the regression reported in column
3 of Table 1 by introducing a dummy variable which takes on the value one after 1985:1 and zero
otherwise. The fourth column of Table 1 documents this regression. When we account for the
structural breakin thisway, thedebt–GNP ratioisnolonger asignificantexplanatory variable. This
suggeststhatitssignificanceinthepreviousregressionwasnottheresultof astablerelationshipover
shorter sub–periods. Indeed, when we estimated the regression within each regime, the debt–GNP
ratio was no longer significant.10 Our preferred model is therefore represented by the regression
model documented in the last column of Table 1. It corresponds to a special case of (1) when ft is
a step function of time that has an upward step at the second quarter of 1985.
Totestthestability of theparametersontheshocksandthelaggedsurplusacrossthetworegimes,
10 The reason for the significance we found in the previous regression seems to stem from the fact that both the surplus and the debt has moved
upward during 1980s.












Figure 2: Log–Likelihoood Function
we also regressed the residuals from our preferred regression on the explanatory variables within
each regime. We could not reject the joint hypothesis that these parameters are constant across
regimes. In other words, the change in policy stance is largely consistent with an increase in the
permanent components of the surplus after the first quarter of 1985 rather than a change in the
marginal responsiveness of the surplus to the exogenous shocks.11
Based on these empirical results, we can interpret the Canadian government’s surplus process
as follows: Under the fiscal policy rule that was in place in the 1960s and 1970s, the exogenous
fiscal shocks accountedfor about70%of thevariation in theprimary surplus. Until the mid–1970s,
the combination of the policy rule and the shocks had resulted in positive surpluses on average.
Beginning in the mid–1970s, however, the exogenous shocks caused a sustained period of deficits
and resulted in the rising debt under the original policy rule. Instead of adjusting its fiscal policy
immediately in responsetothedeficitsandrisingdebt, thegovernmentcontinuedtheoriginal policy
until 1985when itadjustedthesurpluslevel upwardpermanently. Thisadjustment,alongwithmore
favorable exogenous shocks, resulted in a return to positive primary surpluses in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The behavior of the Canadian primary surplus therefore appears to be more consistent
with the political economy model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) than with the tax smoothing model
of Barro (1979).
11 As we show below, a forecast of the surplus in the latter half of the sample using data from the first half of the sample tracks the actual surplus
quite well (see Figure 2). This suggsts that the high R2 is not due to overfitting.
73. Fiscal Risk Management
The analysis of the previous section raises some intriguing questions: Given that much of the vari-
ation in the surplus can be replicated by the return on a portfolio of international securities, could
the government mitigate the impact of these fiscal shocks by hedging the risk? Moreover, under
what conditions would such a policy be desirable? In this section, we investigate the potential role
for systematic fiscal risk management as part of the government’s overall debt policy. To do so, we
develop a framework for analyzing the impact of the government’s fiscal policy on welfare that is
consistentwiththeinternational assetpricingmodel thatweusefordeterminingthecostof hedging.
3.1 A Small Open Economy
Consider a small open economy populated with a large number of identical, infinitely–lived house-
holds. Time is discrete. Let zt be the state variable that summarizes the exogenous shocks in period
t, and zt = (z0;z1;:::zt) be the history of shocks up to period t. We assume that there is a complete
world financial market in which all contingent claims with payoffs that are a measurable function
of z(t) can be traded. Under this assumption and the assumption of no–arbitrage, there exists a se-
quence of stochastic discount factors, fMtgtº0, such that the time t price of a contingent claim that









The small open economy assumption implies that the stochastic discount factors are exogenous
with respect to domestic agents’ actions. In particular, changes in the domestic government’s fiscal
policy has no effect on them.
Thedomestichouseholds’ preferencesovertheconsumption plan c = fctgtº0 arerepresentedby
autility function U(c). Here, wedonotimposeany restrictionson U(:) exceptthatitis concaveand
that, for any c and ± > 0, U(c+±) > U(c), where c+± is defined as fct+±gtº0. In particular, U(:)
can be the same or different from those of the foreign investors and it can represent non–expected
utility, as in Epstein and Zin (1989), or time non–separable utility, as in Abel (1990). Our welfare
measure defined below is independent of these considerations.




t ; 0 < ® < 1; (4)
where yt and kt are the period t output and capital input, respectively, and At is the domestic pro-
ductivity, which growsataconstantrate », i.e. At = A0e»t. Thecapital investmentdecision ismade
one period ahead but can be state contingent. Thus, in period t, the household commits to a state
12 See, for example, Harrison and Kreps (1979).
8contingentinvestmentplan by buyinga contingentclaim kt+1(z(t);zt+1). For simplicity we assume
full depreciation. The government taxes this output at the rate ¿t. In each period, the household
allocates her after–tax output between consumption, capital investment and investment in financial
contingent claims. Let ct and bt+1(z(t);zt+1) denote the household’s consumption and contingent










· (1 ¡ ¿t)Atk
®
t + bt: (5)
Under thecompletemarketassumption, Fisher separation applieswith respecttothe household’s








t ¡ Mt+1kt+1]: (6)








E0Mtct · W0g: (7)
In particular, the government’s fiscal policy affects the household’s welfare only through its impact
on current wealth W0. Thus, from now on, we will refer to W0 as the household’s welfare. As
we mentioned above, this welfare measure is independent of the specification of the preference
for the domestic households. Therefore, any welfare gains from fiscal risk management must come
from increasingthedomestichousehold’s wealth, notfrom smoothingthehousehold’sconsumption
profile.
For any given fiscal policy, the household chooses her investment decision to maximize her
production wealth, W0. It is straightforward to show that the optimal investment rule is given by
^ kt+1 = [®(1 ¡ ¿t+1)At+1]
1
1¡®; (8)
so that the household’s maximized wealth is












Given a joint distribution over future fiscal policy and the stochastic discount factor, (9) can be
used to compute aggregate expected wealth. With complete markets, changes in wealth provide a
compensating variation measure of welfare, that is independent of domestic preferences. Note that
thiswelfarefunctionisastochasticversionofthewelfarefunctionusedintheoriginal taxsmoothing
paper by Barro(1979). However, insteadof assumingthatthe costsof revenuecollection per period
as a time–invariant convex function of the tax rate, here we derive the welfare function from the
fundamentals. In this sense, we provide a microfoundation for the welfare function used by Barro.
93.2 The Government’s Fiscal Policy
Government expenditure in period t is Gt = Gt(zt). We assume that fGtgtº0 is an exogenous
stochastic process. The government’s primary surplus in period t is then
St = ¿tAt^ k
®
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t bethetrendGNP ,st = St=yt,andgt = Gt(zt)=yt.





0: The implied primary
surplus–trend GNP ratio can then be expressed as
st = µt ¡ gt(zt): (11)
Note that because of the production distortion, there is a Laffer curve associated with the collection
of tax revenue. The maximum revenue that can be raised occurs when ¿ = 1 ¡ ®, or when the
effective tax rate is given by







Theexpressionof theequilibrium primary surplusprocessin (11)isconsistentwith theempirical
specification we used in section 2 with ½ = 0. In fact, if we assume that
g(zt) = g ¡ a
0Xt ¡ "t; (13)
where g denotes the mean government spending to trend GNP ratio, then, it follows that the per-
manent component of the government’s policy variables (the first term in 1) can be represented
as
ft = µt ¡ g: (14)
Thus, a change in ft corresponds to a change in the effective tax rate µt.
If the government could issue state–contingent debt, then it can be easily shown that the optimal
tax policy would imply a constant effective tax rate across time and states. However, if the govern-
mentcan only issuerisk–freedebt, aconstanttax ratemay resultin adebtpath thatisunsustainable.
To ensure sustainability in this case, a policy rule has to be specified to determine how the tax pol-
icy will change in response to the rising debt. In the following, we consider a policy rule that is
consistent with the empirical behavior of the primary surplus we reported in section 2.
Let Dt(µ) be the level of government debt at the end of period t when the effective tax rate in
period t is µ. Then, we have
Dt = (1 + rt¡1)Dt¡1 ¡[µ ¡ gt(zt)]yt: (15)







to be the present value of the government’s primary surpluses if the tax rate continues to be µ in the
future. We define the ‘‘net debt’’ as the debt minus the present value of future surpluses under the
existing tax policy, Dt ¡ Vt(µ0).
We assume that the government faces an upper bound, Á, on the net debt–trend GNP ratio. The
effective tax rate will remain at its ‘‘normal’’ level, µ0; as long as the net debt-trend GNP ratio is
below the upper bound. Whenever the ratio reaches or exceeds the upper bound, the tax rate is
raised to a ‘‘crisis’’ level, µ
¤; until the net debt, evaluated under the normal tax regime, falls to zero.
At this point the effective tax rate is set back to its normal level. Thus, if the effective tax rate in





µ0 if µt = µ0 and Dt ¡Vt(µ0) < Áyt
µ
¤ if µt = µ0 and Dt ¡Vt(µt) ¸ Áyt
µ0 if µt > µ0 and Dt ¡Vt(µ0) · 0
(17)
where µ
¤ is set high enough so that the net debt declines on average over time:
Dt ¡ Vt(µ
¤
t+1) < 0: (18)
The level at which the crisis tax rate is set determines the average speed with which the net debt
is reduced, and the normal tax regime is resumed. Given this policy rule, we can then evaluate the
impact of risk management on welfare.13
3.3 Hedging Strategy and Its Evaluation
Without hedging, the government debt evolves according to the following equation:
Dt ¡ Dt¡1 = rt¡1Dt¡1 ¡ St = rt¡1Dt¡1 ¡ [µt ¡ g + a
0Xt + "t]yt: (19)
Foragiven effectivetax rate, thedebtmay increaserapidly if thesurplusprocessexperiencesalarge
negativeshock—anunusually lowvalueof a0Xt. Exante,thegovernmentcanavoidthesenegative
shocks throughhedging. Supposethat, atsomedatet, thegovernmentadopts avery simplehedging
strategy — replacing the volatile component of the primary surplus, a0X¿¹ y¿, with a deterministic
cash–flowthatisa constantpercentageof thetrend GNP ,s, and which hasthesamepresentvalue.14
13 Although this policy rule is consistent with our empirical observations in Section 2, it is not unique.
14 Since the US dollar value of Xt is determined in the US financial market and is independnt of the Canadian government’s actions, there are no
transactions costs due to the potential for the government to partially default on its liabilities by inflating.
11The government can do this by holding a portfolio whose payoff in period ¿ > t is
h(X¿;¿) = (s ¡ a
0X¿)¹ y¿; (20)
or by entering into an Index–Linked–Swap with investors, with the floating index being a0X¿¹ y¿.15
For the portfolio to be self–financing, the cash flow s must satisfy
s =
P1




Under this hedging strategy, theprocess thatgoverns the evolution of the governmentdebt becomes
D¿ ¡ D¿¡1 = r¿¡1D¿¡1 ¡ [µ¿ ¡ g + s + "¿]y¿; (22)
for ¿ > t. Under hedging the debt process is less volatile. However, whether the net debt is less
likely to hit the upper bound under hedging depends on the value of s, which reflects the financial
cost of hedging — the risk premium that must be paid to investors. If hedging is costless, then
the government should be able to replace the cash flow a0X¿¹ y¿ with its expected value Et[a0X¿¹ y¿].
Thus,thedifferencebetweentheexpectedvalueandtheactual paymentitreceives,Et[a0X¿¹ y¿]¡s¹ y¿
represents the financial cost of hedging. Since the vector X¿ is demeaned its expected value equals
zero, so the hedging cost is effectively indexed by s. When the hedging cost is high the value of s
could be very low or even negative16, and the debt may grow faster under hedging.
In order to quantify the hedging cost and to evaluate domestic households’ welfare, we need to
specify a joint stochastic process for the discount factor Mt and the state variable Xt. We assume
that the vector ~ Xt, which consists of the asset returns VWR, DIV , TBILL and LONGR, follows a
vector autoregressive (V AR) process:
~ Xt = A~ Xt¡1 + ut (23)
where A is a matrix of coefficients and ut » N(0;§). Note that the vector ~ Xt does not include
one of the factors we used in Xt — TBMA, the one–year moving average of TBILL. However,
given the estimatedprocess for the asset returns, the value of TBMA can be easily constructed. The
process is estimated using quarterly data from 1958:1 to 1994:4.






function of the lagged state variables given by
¹t = c
0 ~ Xt¡1 + ´t; (24)
where´t is N(0;¾2
´), Et¡1["t´t] = 0 andEt¡1[ut´t] = v. Theeffective interest rate on government
15 Various kinds of Index–Linked–Swaps have now been widely traded by many financial institutions, although not with infinite maturity. We
discuss the potential problems of implementing such a swap in the conclusion.
16 That is, to shift the risky cash flow to the investors, the government may receive in return only a very small amount of deterministic cash flow
or even have to pay the investors.
12debt rt is also assumed depend on lagged state variables:
rt = B ~ Xt¡1 + brt¡1 + ³t; (25)
where ³t » N(0;¾): This, together with the estimated processes for the asset returns (23) and the
stochastic discount factor (24), represents a restricted V AR.
Becausethestochasticdiscountfactorisnotdirectly observable,an assetpricingmodel isneeded
to estimate equation (24). There are several consumption–based asset pricing models that we could
use, none of which is perfect. In this paper, we adopt the consumption CAPM based on the non–
expected utility model proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989). We choose this asset
pricing model for two reasons: 1) Studies have shown that it performs better than the standard
consumption CAPM based on additively separable utilities, and 2) there are micro studies that pro-
vide us with some sense about the range of values that the parameters should take.17 Like most
other consumption CAPM models, it is difficult for the Epstein–Zin model to generate realistic
risk–premiums with plausible parameter values. This suggests that the hedging cost implied by the
model may be too low. To check the robustness of our results, we vary the hedging cost indepen-
dently in evaluating welfare gains. In addition, we also report results based on an alternative asset
pricing model — Abel’s (1990) ‘‘Catching up with Joneses’’ model.

















Here, C¿ denotes the US per capita consumption, Rm
t denotes the gross real return on the market
portfolio (measured by the real value–weighted stock return index on the NYSE), ¾ is the elasticity





where ° is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The variable ~ M¿ is a real stochastic discount
factor that can be used to price contingent claims in real US good units. To price cash–flows in
Canadian dollars, the appropriate stochastic discount factor is M¿ = ~ M¿(P¿e¿)¡1, where P¿ is the
US CPI and e¿ is the nominal exchange rate.
Given the domestic production technology, fiscal policy rule and the asset pricing model spec-
ified above, we can now evaluate the implications of fiscal risk management on fiscal policy, sus-
tainability and welfare.
17 See Kocherlakota (1995) for a review of asset pricing models.
133.4 Calibration
Production function: We set ® = 0:33 and assume that the initial capital stock k0 has been chosen
optimally, so that k0 = [®(1 ¡ ¿0)A0]
1
1¡®.
AssetPricingModel: Wefollowothersintheliteratureby setting¯ = 0:99. Foreach valueof ° we
set ¾ so that the implied steady–state risk free quarterly nominal interest rate is fixed at 3%. For a
coefficientof risk–aversion° = 4, thiscalibrationyieldsavalueforthemarginal rateof substitution
of ¾ = 0:53: Although, there is widespread disagreement regarding the appropriate values of °
and ¾, we adopt these values for our benchmark economy because they are in the range that most
observers seem to find acceptable (see Kocherlakota, 1996). However, in the following analysis,
we evaluate the hedging strategy under several different combinations of parameter values. Given
these parameter values and the V AR described above, it is straightforward to price the components
of the surplus and, hence, to determine the value of s (see appendix for details).18
Fiscal Policy Rule: For the policy rule to be fully specified, we must choose values for µ0, µ
¤ and
Á. From (14) and the regression analysis in section 2, we have that
µt ¡ g = ft =
½
c1 = :006514; if t · t¤;
c2 = :016453; if t > t¤: (28)
We interpret c1 + g as the normal tax rate µ0, c2 + g as the emergency tax rate µ
¤ and t¤ as the
time when the net debt–trend GNP ratio hit the boundary Á. Thus, under the normal tax regime, the
primary surplus process evolves according to the following equation
st = c1 + a
0Xt + "t;
wherethevaluesof a is determinedfrom the regression analysis in section 2. From theassetpricing
model specified above we can determine the present value Vt¤(µ0), and the value of Á is then set
to be the net debt–trend GNP ratio at t¤, (Dt¤ ¡ Vt¤(µ0))=yt¤. Given our estimate that the shift in
policy stanceoccurredafterthefirstquarterof 1985, theimpliedvalueof theupperboundonthenet
debt/trend GNP ratio, Á, is about 0.80. We use this value for our benchmark economy, but consider
the sensitivity of our results to alternative values.
Initial Conditions: We take the perspective of a government that starts to hedge in 1977:1 and has
only the information available up to the last quarter of 1976. The sixth column of Table 1 (titled
‘‘pre–77’’) documents the results of estimating the model over the period 1958:1 to 1976:4. As can
be seen the coefficient estimates are quite robust to this truncation of the sample period. The fact
thatweareabletoidentify thereplicatingportfolioex ante suggests thatour empirical specification
should provide a useful basis for hedging the shocks to the surplus. Indeed, as Figure 3 illustrates,
18 Details of the results from estimating this V AR, can be found in the the appendix.
14a forecast conditional on the realized asset returns and the shift in policy stance, performs rather
well in replicating the actual surplus in the post–sample period 1977:1 to 1994:4. This conditional
forecast replicates over 80% of the variation in the surplus.
































































Figure 3: Forecasting the Primary Surplus
3.5 Results
Using the data from our simulation, we estimate the probability that the initial policy first becomes
unsustainable and the government is forced to raise the tax rate. To do this we counted the number
of paths along which the tax is increased for the first time. Figure 4 shows the evolution of this
probability after t =1977:1 both with and without hedging. Without hedging, the probability that
the original policy rule wouldhave becomeunsustainable within the following100 quarters (i.e. by
the last quarter of 2002), is Q(100) = 0:36. With hedging it drops to QH(100) = 0:05. In other
words, hadthe government begun to use this simple risk management strategy in the firstquarter of
1977, it would have reduced the ex ante probability that its policy would become unsustainable at
some time before the end of 2002, by over 85%. But what does this increased sustainability imply
for the expected tax rate and welfare ?
Figure 5 shows the average tax rates that result from the policy rule in the benchmark economy,
with andwithouthedgingover 150years. Ascan be seen, theexpectedtax rates rise initially in both
cases. This is because the net debt is initially positive and hence trends upward on average. The


































Figure 4: Sustainability of Initial Policy
average tax rate rises less rapidly with hedging than without, reflecting the reduced likelihood of
hitting the upper bound on the net debt level. Once the tax has been increased, the net debt begins
to decline on averagesothateventually, the tax ratecan bereducedto its ‘‘normal level’’. Over time
there are more paths realizing falling taxes on average than there are paths realizing rising taxes, so
that the average tax rate falls.19 In the long run, the tax rate remains lower under hedging because
(1)theprobability of havingtoincreasetaxesin thefutureislower, and(2)theaveragerateatwhich
the net debt is reduced once the tax is raised is greater.
We compute the welfare gain arising from hedging using (9). The first row of Table 2 shows
the aggregate wealth levels with and without hedging, and the welfare change for the benchmark
economy. In particular it shows the flow welfare change as a percentage of initial GNP and the
percentage change in welfare. As can be seen the former increase is approximately 1.42% and the
latter is 0.64%.
In principle, this welfare gain could come from two sources: (1) the reduction in expected taxes
and (2) the reduced variation in taxes via the concavity of the production function. However, by far
the greatest part of the gain comes from the former. To show that this is the case we computed a
first–order approximation tothe welfaregain(see appendix) andfoundthatover 99%of the welfare
19 Note thateven afterthe net debtis reduced to zero, some paths realize sufficiently bad shocks tomake the netdebt positive again andto eventually
experience rising taxes again. However, the average tax rate still declines.











































Figure 5: Expected Tax Rates
gain derives from the reduction in taxes.20 In other words, in our model, the gains from hedging
come predominantly from the increased sustainability of the low tax policy.
To investigate the nature of these welfare gains further and to assess the sensitivity of our results
to the various assumptions wehave made, we allow the key underlying parameters to vary from our
benchmark case. The results are given in Table 2.
Risk Aversion (°): We varied °, while at the same time adjusting ¾ to maintain the same long run
risk–free interest rate. Results for ° = 2 and ° = 10 are shown in Table 2. As one might expect,
raising risk aversion lowers welfare whether the government hedges or not. However, the welfare
gain from hedging is non–monotonically related to the coefficient of risk–aversion, initially rising
with ° and then falling.21 There are several effects from raising °:
² The risk premium required by the representative investor increases. This drives up the financial
cost of hedging (a reduction in s), which feeds into higher expected taxes under hedging, thereby
reducing the welfare gain.
² The market value of the increase in domestic wealth rises. These is because as ° is increased, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ¾, must be reduced to maintain a constant risk–free interest
rate. It follows that the value of increasing the sustainability of the low tax policy (i.e. delaying the
tax hike) rises, so that the welfare gain from hedging increases.
20 This is generally the case under all of the alternatives considered below.
21 The turning point in this relationship occurs approximately when ° = 7:
17² The present value of future surpluses under the initial policy, V (µ0), decreases. The resulting
higher initial net debt reduces the sustainability of the initial tax policy and reduces the welfare
gain.
To separate the effects of changing risk preferences from that of changing initial conditions, we
also report in Table 2 results for ° = 2 and ° = 10 when the debt level is adjusted so that the initial
netdebtisthesameasthatfor ° = 4. Aftercontrollingfortheinitial netdebtin thisway,thewelfare
gain increases monotonically with risk aversion. This shows that the increase in the hedging cost
due to the increase in risk aversion is more than compensated for by the gains from the increased
sustainability of the initial low tax policy.
Hedging Cost (¡s): To isolate the role of the increase in financial cost of hedging from other
aspects of the increase in risk aversion, we fixed °, but varied the hedging cost directly, so that it
wouldequal thecostassociatedwithlowerorhighervaluesof°:Ascanbeseen,raisingthishedging
cost lowers the welfare gain unambiguously.. If it is raised enough, the welfare gain eventually
becomes negative. Note, however, that within a range consistent with the Epstein–Zin CAPM, the
hedgingcostisneverreally highenoughtohavemuchimpacton thewelfaregain. Thisisconsistent
with the inability of the model to account for the equity–premium puzzle.
Initial Net Debt (D0¡V0(µ0)): In the benchmark case, the initial netdebt–GNP trend ratiois 0.28.
Loweringittozeroraiseswelfarebecausethereduction makestheneedfora taxhikelessimminent
(as indicated by the low probability of a tax hike within the first 100 quarters, Q(100)). Lowering
the net debt also raises slightly the welfare gain from hedging. Increasing the net debt to 0.799, so
thatitmakesan immediate tax hikevery likely, lowers welfareandsignificantly reduces the welfare
gain from hedging. In this case, hedging actually increases the probability of a tax hike. With a
high initial level and a strictly positive effective interest rate the net debt is expected to rise and hit
the upper bound quickly, and hedging reduces the chance of having positive shocks to the surplus
that would help to revert the upward trend. Interestingly, however, there are still significant welfare
gains from hedging, reflecting the more rapid reduction in the netdebt under hedgingfollowing the
first tax increase and the lower likelihood of further tax hikes in the future.
Starting Date (t0): The starting date for the adoption of the hedging strategy in the benchmark
economy, t0 =1977:1, was approximately in the middle of the sample. This is a date at which the
debt level and the realized values of the asset returns are such that the initial net debt is well below
the trigger point and the hedging cost takes on a relatively low value. We also ran our simulation
with a starting date of t0 =1985:1. As noted above this is a date at which the net debt is just
about to exceed the upper bound and it is also a date such that the implied cost of hedging is high.
The combination of these two factors reduces the welfare gain from hedging significantly. Note,
however, that the welfare gains are still positive because of the more rapid reduction in the net debt
18under hedging following the first tax increase, and the lower likelihood of further tax hikes in the
future.
Upper Bound on the Net Debt (Á): Lowering the net debt–GNP ratio at which the government
increases taxes to 0.60 raises the likelihood of tax increases, thereby raising the expected tax rate
and lowering welfare. Raising Á to 1.00 has the opposite effects. Quantitatively, however, such
changes in Á have very small effects on the welfare gains from hedging.
Alternative Asset Pricing Model: Since the Epstein–Zin model cannot generate realistic risk pre-
miums with reasonablevaluesof theparameters, wealsoconsider analternativeassetpricingmodel
to check the robustness of our results on welfare gains. The model we considered is Abel’s (1990)
Catching–up–with–the–Joneses CAPM.22 According to this model, individuals derive utility from
how well they are doing relative to how well the average person is doing today and how well the
average person did last period. The advantage of this model is that it allows an extra degree of
freedom, so that the equity premium puzzle can be solved with low risk aversion parameters. As
before, we calibrate so that the risk–free interest rate equals 3%. Table 2 reports the results for two
sets of parameter values. The first, denoted ‘‘Low Cost’’, represents parameter values for which the
hedging cost is equal to that in the benchmark economy. The second, denoted ‘‘High Cost’’, repre-
sents parameter values such that the sensitivity of utility to per capita consumption is sufficiently
large (according to Abel’s results) to account for the equity premium. We found that the welfare
gain ranges from 0.89%to 1%of currentGNP . Therobustness of our results across these alternative
CAPMs is largely due to our underlying assumption thatthe discount factor is a log–linear function
of the state–variables.
3.6 When Should the Government Hedge ?
An important implication of this sensitivity analysis is that initial conditions — especially the com-
bination of net debt and hedging cost — matter. Our results should therefore not be taken to imply
that hedging is always desirable. For low levels of initial net debt, hedging reduces the probability
of tax increases and increases the welfare. When the initial net debt level is very high, however,
hedging increases the probability of having an immediate tax hike, and the benefits of hedging tend
to be small. If the hedging cost is also high, then hedging may actually reduce welfare. This does
not imply, however, that the hedging strategy we have described should never be adopted when the
hedgingcostishigh. Itsimply saysthatthenetdebtlevel mustfirstbereduced, by traditional meth-
ods, toasufficiently lowlevel beforethehedgingstrategy isadopted. Itfollowsthatthegovernment
should hedge only after they have put their fiscal house in order — fiscal risk management should
22 See Appendix for details.
19be viewed as a way of helping to avoid future debt problems, not as a method for solving current
ones.
4. Concluding Remarks
The central premise of this paper is that government cash flows are subject to unavoidable fiscal
shocks that are outside the control of the fiscal authorities. In this paper we replicate many of the
shocks to the Canadian federal surplus using the return on a linear combination of US. financial
securities. Wefindthatit is possible tocharacterize thesurplus process over the last four decades as
a stationary function of these shocks with an abrupt regime shift in 1985. Our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the recent rise in public debt experienced by Canada was the result of a
series of negative shocks in the 1970s and1980s, and a long delay in the adjustment of fiscal policy
in response.
Although some fiscal shocks could be offset by varying tax rates and other policy parameters,
this would create further distortions in the economy. The alternative of intertemporal smoothing
throughdebtfinancingisultimately unsustainable. Wehavearguedinthispaperthat, becauseof this
conflict between stability and sustainability, systematic fiscal risk management might be beneficial
as part of the government’s overall debt management strategy. We explored the feasibility of this,
and estimated the potential gains from fiscal risk management in terms of increased sustainability,
reduced tax rates and welfare. Although, the increases in sustainability are large, the welfare gains
are fairly modest (though quite robust). It should be noted, however, that some of our modeling
assumptions are somewhat conservative. In particular, if we allowed for endogenous growth, then
tax changes would have permanent effects, so that the welfare gains from hedging would be much
larger.
In this paper, we have abstracted from several interesting and potentially important issues re-
garding the implementation of a fiscal risk management strategy. The hedging strategy that we
considered requires the government to enter into an index–linked swap with an infinite maturity.
It would be interesting to see if the strategy can be replicated with more conventional financial
instruments. There is also the issue of default risk that is often associated with swaps of long ma-
turity. In this paper we have dealt with this problem to some extent by having the payoffs of the
swap denominated in US dollars. This eliminates the possibility of partial default by the Canadian
government through inflation. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of direct or indirect
default by the government through other means, and it would be interesting to evaluate the welfare
gains from hedging by taking into account credit riskexplicitly.23 Finally, there is the issue of time–
consistency. In this paper we assume that once the government decides to implement the hedging
23 Note, however, that hedging should reduce the default risk premium already implicit in the effective interest rate on the debt, thereby offsetting
the increased cost of hedging.
20strategy, it will stick to it in the future. However, our simulations show that the gains from hedging
depend crucially on the initial level of the net debt. A hedging strategy that is welfare improving
ex ante may become welfare reducing ex post if a series of adverse and unhedgable shocks occur
that cause the net debt to increase significantly in the future. Finding a welfare–enhancing hedging
strategy that is also time–consistent is another interesting avenue for further research.
We have used Canadian federal finances to illustrate the importance of exogenous fiscal shocks
to the rising public debt problems and to explore the feasibility and desirability of systematic fiscal
risk management. However, the conceptual framework and empirical methodology that we have
employed here could also be applied to the fiscal problems of other OECD countries, as well as to
those of the US states and Canadian provinces. Such analysis is important given the emphasis on
governments’ responses to fiscal shocks in the current literature on budget deficits.
In analyzing the role of fiscal risk management, we have focused on diversifiable shocks to
the government’s primary surplus. Since not all the shocks to the primary surplus can be hedged
away, there is still a need for the government to smooth cash flows intertemporally by issuing risk–
free bonds. Thus, debt management in the form of hedging interest rate risk and choosing the
optimal maturity structure as suggested by, among others, Boothe and Reid (1991), Missale and
Blanchard (1994) and Barro (1995) are also important for maintaining stability and enhancing the
sustainability of fiscal policy. The risk management strategy we emphasize here is complementary
to their suggestions on debt management.
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23Table 1 – Decomposing the Primary Surplus
Variable Shock Lag Debt Dummy Shift Pre–77 No Lag
VWR 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004
(0.57) (1.56) (0.90) (0.43) (0.43) (0.04) (0.55)
DIV -1.28 -0.54 -0.64 -0.69 -0.69 -0.70 -1.09
(12.97) (5.01) (6.06) (7.04) (7.09) (5.05) (14.18)
X LONGR -0.22 -0.08 -0.22 -0.33 -0.33 -0.30 -0.51
(3.57) (1.59) (3.73) (5.62) (5.68) (2.53) (9.24)
TBILL 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.35
(3.34) (3.29) (4.88) (6.26) (6.34) (2.47) (7.71)
TBMA 0.38 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.41
(5.92) (1.46) (3.13) (3.82) (3.97) (2.47) (8.46)
Constant 0.0534 0.0218 0.0167 0.0319 0.0317 0.0319 0.0506
(18.70) (5.48) (4.21) (6.64) (8.39) (5.35) (23.15)
SLAG — 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.24 —
(9.58) (7.77) (5.83) (5.86) (2.24)
DEBT — — 0.0070 -0.0002 — — —
(4.18) (0.09)
DUM — — — 0.0109 0.0108 — 0.0157
(4.91) (6.70) (10.30)
NOBS 148 148 148 148 148 76 148
R
2
0.68 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.82
D–W 0.69 2.06 2.06 2.03 2.04 1.96 1.20
CUSUM 5.69 3.63 3.21 — — — —
FTEST 25.6 7.30 5.00 — — 2.09 —
[.000] [.000] [.000] — — [0.08] —
Notes:
(1) t–statistics are given in parenthesis.
(2) P–values in square brackets.
(3) In the first 3 columns, FTEST refers to a Chow test for a structural break in 1985:2. In sixth
column it refers to a test of whether the coefficients on the X–variables in and out of sample are the
same.
(4) The X-variables are not demeaned in these regressions.
24Table 2 – Implications of Hedging for Sustainability and Welfare





Benchmark 0.36 0.05 60.78 61.16 1.42 0.64
Low risk aversion 0.33 0.03 70.04 70.38 1.13 0.48
— initial debt adjusted 0.38 0.07 69.99 70.35 1.18 0.50
High risk aversion 0.42 0.11 43.13 43.40 1.26 0.63
— initial debt adjusted 0.33 0.02 43.14 43.50 1.68 0.84
Low hedging cost 0.36 0.03 60.78 61.19 1.51 0.68
High hedging cost 0.36 0.07 60.78 61.13 1.32 0.59
Low initial debt 0.25 0.00 60.82 61.22 1.48 0.66
High initial debt 0.88 0.98 60.51 60.76 0.89 0.39
Later initial date 1.00 1.00 43.85 43.92 0.50 0.16
Low upper bound 0.43 0.12 60.76 61.15 1.45 0.65
High upper bound 0.31 0.02 60.78 61.17 1.47 0.66
Keeping up with Low Cost 0.35 0.02 82.78 83.11 1.00 0.40
the Joneses High Cost 0.41 0.07 20.85 20.92 0.90 0.38
Notes:
(1) Benchmark: ¯ = 0:99; ° = 4; ¾ = 0:53331; t0=1977:1, Á = 0:8;
(2) Low risk aversion: ° = 2; ¾ = 0:71578: High risk aversion: ° = 10; ¾ = 0:35116
(3) Low initial net debt: D ¡ V = 0. High initial net debt: D ¡ V = 0:799:
(4) Low upper bound: Á = 0:6. High upper bound: Á = 1:00.





The quarterly primary surplus was calculated as the difference between total federal revenues and
expenditures less interest payments on the debt, as published by Statistics Canada. For institutional
reasons, this data exhibits considerable seasonal variation. Specifically, annual crown corporation
cash flows are attributed only to the second quarter yielding a large ‘‘spike’’. We therefore used
seasonally adjusted data. The surplus data does not include charges and subsidies relating to the
Petroleum Compensation fund. Quarterly public debt figures are taken from IMF International
Financial Statistics. Theeffectiveinterestratewascalculatedastheratioof actual interestpayments
on the debt to value of the debt.
4.1.2 Asset Returns
VWR is the index of value–weighted returns on the NYSE taken from the CRSP tape. DIV is the
dividend yield on the NYSE from the CRSP tape. LONGR is the nominal interest rate on 10 year
US. governmentbonds. TBILL isthe nominal 3–month US. treasury bill rate. TBMA is aone–year
fixed–weight moving average of TBILL. All of these returns were converted into Canadian dollars
using the spot U.S.–Canadian exchange rate taken from CITIBASE. Note that these returns should
therefore be interpreted as the return in Canadian dollars on each U.S. dollar invested.
4.1.3 Data used to Compute the Stochastic Discount Factor
Real per capita US consumption was calculated using data from CITIBASE. The real rate of return
on the market portfolio was taken to be equal to VWR divided by the US CPI.
4.2 Details of Algorithm
4.2.1 Asset Valuation
At time t = 0, we use the V AR process to forecast the present value of each component of the








26We computetheseprices as follows. Letmx(t;¿) andmz(t;¿) denotethe¿ –period aheadexpected
value of the financial return vector and the log of the stochastic discount factor, respectively. Let
Vxx(¿), Vxz(¿) and Vzz(¿) denote the blocks of the ¿–period ahead covariance matrix from the
V AR. The distributional assumptions made in Section 3 imply that the present value of the vector
of returns at time ¿, X¿, given information available at time t is
Et[M¿X¿] = yt exp[(» + b)¿]¯
µ¿Et[exp(Z¿)X¿] (A2)




Vzz(¿))[mx(t;¿) + Vxz(¿)]: (A3)
Here the relevant means and covariances can be computed recursively as follows:
mx(t;¿) = Et[X¿] = Amx(t;¿ ¡ 1)
mz(t;¿) = c0mx(t;¿ ¡ 1) + mz(t;¿ ¡ 1)
Vxz(¿) = AVxx(¿ ¡ 1)c + AVxz(¿ ¡ 1) + v
Vzz(¿) = c0Vxx(¿ ¡ 1)c + Vzz(¿ ¡ 1) + c0Vxz(¿ ¡ 1) + ¾2
´
Vxx(¿) = AVxx(¿ ¡ 1)A0 + §:
(A4)
where the parameters of (A4) are obtained from the restricted V AR. Initial values are mx(t;1) =
AXt, mz(t;1) = c0Xt + Zt, Vxz(1) = v, Vzz(1) = ¾2
´ and Vxx(1) = §.
The above can be used to construct the present value of the return stream TBMA, the one–year
moving average of TBILL. Let m4(t;¿) denote the ¿–period ahead expected value of TBILL, and
let V4x(¿) and V4z(¿) denote the covariance vector between TBILL and Xt; and the covariance





[m4(t;¿ ¡ 1) + m4(t;¿ ¡ 2) + m4(t;¿ ¡ 3) + m4(t;¿ ¡ 4)] (A5)





AV4x(¿ ¡ 1) + A
2V4x(¿ ¡ 2) + A




and the conditional covariance with Zt is
V5z =
1
4 [V4z(¿ ¡ 1) + V4z(¿ ¡ 2) + V4z(¿ ¡ 3) + V4z(¿ ¡ 4)]+
1
4c0[V4x(¿ ¡ 4)V4x(¿ ¡ 1)(I + A)V4x(¿ ¡ 2) + (I + A + A2)V4x(¿ ¡3)]+
1
4c0(I + A + A2 + A3)V4x(¿ ¡ 4)
(A7)
Eventually, after T periods the growth in the mean and variance of Mt converge to constants ¢m¤
Z
and ¢V ¤















½ = µln¯+» +b < 0. We can therefore evaluate the present value of the cash flow Xt by iteration

















Note that to calibrate the model, for each value of ° we choose a value of ¾ (fixing ¯ = 0:99) that












is fixed at 0.03.
4.2.2 Computation of Fiscal Policy, Sustainability and Welfare
To compute the probability of policy shifts and the associated welfare impacts, we conducted a
Monte Carlo simulation. For each set of parameters, we estimatedtheunderlying V AR to determine
the parameters of the system and the associated joint distribution of the errors. We used this to
generate random draws for "t, ´t and ut with the required joint distribution and generated N paths
of T periods for the entire system.24 For each path and at each date, we computed the implied debt
level, Dt, and the present value of future forecasted primary surpluses under the current policy,
Vt(µt). We did this for both the hedged and unhedged government cash flow processes. We then
computed the associated net debt and used it to determine the tax rate to be set in the next period
according to the policy rule described in (17). This generated a numerical distribution over the
tax rate which we used to compute welfare.25 Since changes in the tax rate occur infrequently
(i.e. only when the bounds on the net debt are hit), a large number of paths and time periods were
required before our estimated welfare gain converged. Specifically, N = 150;000 and T = 600
were sufficient for convergence of the welfare gain estimate up to the third decimal place:
24 Since the relevant distributions are symmetric around zero, we accelerated the convergence by using the draw itself and its negative.
25 Note of course that the debt and present value calculation is endogenous to the policy choice.
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